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BIG DATA GOVERNANCE NEEDS MORE COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE ROLE OF HARM MITIGATION IN 
THE GOVERNANCE OF DATA USE IN MEDICINE AND 
BEYOND 
Aisling McMahon, Alena Buyx, Barbara Prainsack* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Harms arising from digital data use in the big data context are often systemic and cannot always 
be captured by linear cause and effect. Individual data subjects and third parties can bear the 
main downstream costs arising from increasingly complex forms of data uses – without being 
able to trace the exact data flows. Because current regulatory frameworks do not adequately 
address this situation, we propose a move towards harm mitigation tools to complement existing 
legal remedies. In this article, we make a normative and practical case for why individuals 
should be offered support in such contexts and how harm mitigation tools can achieve this. We 
put forward the idea of ‘Harm Mitigation Bodies’ (HMBs) which people could turn to who feel 
they were harmed by data use but do not qualify for legal remedies, or that existing legal 
remedies do not address their specific circumstances. HMBs would help to obtain a better 
understanding of the nature, severity, and frequency of harms occurring from both legal and 
illegal data use, and they could also provide financial support in some cases. We set out the role 
and form of these HMBs for the first time in this article. 
 
Keywords: Big Data; Biomedical data; Collective responsibility and oversight; Data  
Governance; GDPR; Harm mitigation 
 
 
 
 
Mustafa’s case 
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Mustafa loves good coffee. In his free time, he often browses high-end coffee machines 
that he cannot currently afford but is saving for. One day, travelling to a friend’s 
wedding abroad, he gets to sit next to another friend on the plane. When Mustafa 
complains about how much he paid for his ticket it turns out that his friend paid less 
than half of what he paid. Mustafa googles possible reasons for this and concludes that 
it must be related to his browsing expensive coffee machines and equipment. He is very 
angry about this and complains to the airline, who send him a lukewarm apology that 
refers to their pricing being based on demand. Mustafa feels that this is unfair but lets it 
go because pursuing this would make him lose time and money. 
 
Paula’s case1 
After years of trying to conceive, Paula is pregnant. Five months into the pregnancy the 
unspeakable happens and she loses the baby. Paula and her partner are heartbroken. For 
months after the end of her pregnancy Paula keeps receiving advertisements from shops 
specialised on maternity and infant products and services congratulating her on the 
‘milestones’ of her supposed baby. This is an immensely aggravating and distressing 
experience for Paula and her partner. Paula’s partner calls up the companies that send 
these advertisements, demanding them to erase their names from their database. He also 
demands to hear where they got Paula’s contact details in the first place, but he does not 
receive any answers. Paula suspects that one of her doctors passed on her details to 
retailers, but she cannot prove it.  
 
                                                 
*The authors would like to thank TT Arvind, Rebekah Farrell, Carrie Friese, Hanna Kienzler, Thomas King (UK 
Royal Statistical Society) and Graeme Laurie for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. They are also 
grateful to the comments of anonymous reviewers. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 This vignette is inspired by Mary Ebeling’s important book: Mary F. Ebeling, Healthcare and Big Data (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016). 
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INTRODUCTION 
These brief vignettes demonstrate the potential for individuals to be harmed by data use in the 
big data era particularly, given the pervasive nature of such data. The ‘pervasiveness’2 of data 
means that in the context of large, digital, connected or connectable, and often fast-changing 
datasets, harms are often systemic and cannot be captured by linear cause and effect. 
Downstream harms arising from digital data use can fall outside of the remit of traditional legal 
remedies because they do not fit the traditional chain of causality which legal actions typically 
require – such as under: the tort of misuse of private information in the UK context,3 or for 
some actions under the new European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)4, 
or for the right to private and family life (Art 8 European Convention on Human Rights). 
Specifically, people who experience harms that they can plausibly assume stems from data use 
may not have access to legal remedies for two reasons: First, because the action that led to the 
harm was lawful – such as in the case of Mustafa, who was affected by personalised pricing 
practices that many people may consider unfair,5 but that are not illegal. Second, even if it is 
apparent that the action that caused the harm must have been unlawful (such as in Paula’s case, 
where somebody must have infringed data protection laws and passed on her information to 
retailers) it may be impossible to prove that a specific instance of data use caused a specific 
                                                 
2 See <https://pervade.umd.edu/about/data-ethics-regulators/> accessed 8th April 2019 and  Jacob Metcalf, ‘“The 
study has been approved by the IRB”: Gayface AI, research hype and the pervasive data ethics gap’ (2017) 
Medium (30 November) < https://medium.com/pervade-team/the-study-has-been-approved-by-the-irb-gayface-
ai-research-hype-and-the-pervasive-data-ethics-ed76171b882c> accessed 8th April 2019. 
3 This tort was recognised by the UK courts in Vidal-Hall v Google [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) which allowed data 
subjects to bring a claim against data controllers for compensation in cases of distress caused by data use. In this 
case the claimants’ online browsing activities was tracked by Google and used to profile the claimants and then 
direct targeted advertisements to them. The claimants complained of the distress they suffered based on Google’s 
use of these characteristics without their consent/knowledge to send targeted advertisements, and the risk that such 
personal characteristics could have come to the knowledge of third parties who used/saw their devices. 
4 Art 82(1) GDPR 2016/679 provides that: “Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a 
result of an infringement of this Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the controller or 
processor for the damage suffered”. The GDPR became directly applicable on 25th May 2018. 
5 See discussion in: Timothy J. Richards, Jura Liaukonyte, Nadia A.Streletskayab, ‘Personalized pricing and 
price fairness’ (2016) 44 International Journal of Industrial Organization 138-153. 
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harm and therefore the chain of causation required for legal remedies may be lacking.6 This 
may be because the harm was caused not by a single specific use of that individual’s data, but 
by the use of data from different sources in combination, or where harm to a specific individual 
resulted from the use of another individual’s data, without the former being at all aware of this 
usage. Digital data are also multiple in the sense that they can be in more than one place at once, 
and that they can be interlinked in various ways,7 which makes it extremely difficult to trace 
the movements of data in specific cases. These circumstances can leave individual data subjects, 
such as Mustafa and Paula, and third parties unable to prove causal links between data use(s) 
and the harm suffered, leaving them to bear the downstream costs in the form of harms arising 
from increasingly complex forms of data uses – without clear legal remedies.  
 
At the same time, downstream costs on data controllers, who often derive significant 
commercial benefits from such uses, are limited. This amounts to a significant imbalance of 
benefits and harms, and, more broadly speaking, of power between data users and data subjects 
or third parties. 
 
In view of this situation, a recalibration of data governance is necessary. As part of a larger 
programme of thinking about data-governance,8 this article makes the case for harm mitigation 
                                                 
6 The principles of accountability and responsibility under the GDPR do not displace this point. This is because 
for compensation, the controller/processor is exempt only if they can prove that the damage is not linked to their 
actions. Damage assessment thus depends on causation, as do other aspects.  
7 Barbara Prainsack, ‘Data donation: How to resist the iLeviathan’ in Jenny Krutzinna and Luciano Floridi (eds) 
The Ethics of Medical Data Donation (Springer, 2019) at 9-22. 
8 The programme is outlined in Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, ‘A solidarity-based approach to the governance 
of research biobanks’ (2013) 21(1) Medical Law Review 71-91; Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, Solidarity in 
Biomedicine and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, ‘Thinking 
ethical and regulatory frameworks in medicine from the perspective of solidarity on both sides of the Atlantic’ 
(2016) 37 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 489-501; Barbara Prainsack, ‘Research for personalised medicine: 
Time for solidarity’ (2017). 36(1) Medicine and Law 87-98; Gesine Richter, Christoph Borzikowski, Wolfgang 
Lieb, Stefan Schreiber, Michael Krawczak, Alena Buyx, ‘Patient views on research use of clinical data without 
consent: Legal, but also acceptable?’ 25.01.2019 European Journal of Human Genetics; Amelia Fiske, Alena 
Buyx, Barbara Prainsack, ‘Health Information Counselors: A New Profession for the Age of Big Data?’ (2019) 
94(1) Academic Medicine 37-41; Gesine Richter, Michael Krawczak, Wolfgang Lieb, Lena Wolff, Stefan 
Schreiber, Alena Buyx , ‘Broad consent for healthcare-embedded biobanking: understanding and reasons to donate 
in a large patient sample’ 20 (1) Genetics in Medicine 76-82. 
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tools to complement existing legal frameworks. In doing so, we put forward a normative and 
practical rationale for why individuals should be offered support in such contexts, and why 
systems for monitoring such ‘harms’ should be established. We envisage these functions being 
conducted by a ‘Harm Mitigation Body’ (HMB), which could also establish financial support 
mechanisms. While two of the authors have sketched the general idea of such bodies in previous 
work,9 we set out the role and form of these HMBs for the first time in this article. 
 
At the outset, we also acknowledge that the adoption of the GDPR takes positive steps to 
address some of the issues caused by big data practices. For example, the GDPR’s principle of 
accountability of data controllers moves the onus of proof onto data controllers thereby 
reducing the need for data subjects to demonstrate causation in many contexts. However, as 
will be demonstrated, gaps remain and the GDPR’s remit is still too narrow to provide effective 
harm mitigation for all data subjects.  To address this, the proposed HMB framework could 
provide support for harms caused through data use: (a) in cases where data use did not breach 
the GDPR; and (b) in countries where the GDPR is not applicable. Moreover, HMBs would not 
focus on policing (and placing fines on) data controllers but on providing support to data 
subjects. They thus complement, rather than duplicate or compete with, the institutions and 
instruments of the GDPR. 
 
In making these arguments, the article is structured as follows: Part I sets out the value of ‘big 
data’ in today’s world and the challenges it poses for governance. It puts forward a normative 
and practical case for a renewed focus on the need for harm mitigation, and our novel tool to 
do so, the HMB. Following this, Part II describes the main functions and legal adaptations of 
                                                 
9  Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, ‘A solidarity-based approach to the governance of research biobanks’ (2013) 
21(1) Medical Law Review 71-91; Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine and Beyond 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
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such HMBs, setting out an operational overview illustrating how these bodies would work 
within the national data protection context, and their structural composition etc. 
 
While the arguments were initially developed in the context of the governance of data for 
biomedical research and practice, the harm mitigation framework spelled out here is not limited 
to the medical domain, but, in principle, applicable to any instance of data use.  
 
I. BACKGROUND: BIG DATA AND THE NEED FOR NEW GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORKS 
 
A. The context: Big Data in biomedicine 
‘Big data’10 are a key resource for medical research and increasingly also medical practice in 
the digital era. Owing to advances in information technologies it has become easier to link data 
from multiple sources and datasets in recent years,11 with many knock-on benefits for medical 
research. In the definition of the Garter IT glossary, which the UK Information Commissioner’s 
Office refers to, big data are “…high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets 
that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight 
and decision making.”12 Big data practices and epistemologies are hoped to help improve the 
                                                 
10 Defined by the EU Commission as: “large amounts of different types of data produced from various types of 
sources, such as people, machines or sensors. This data could be climate information, satellite imagery, digital 
pictures and videos, transition records or GPS signals. Big Data may involve personal data: that is, any information 
relating to an individual, and can be anything from a name, a photo, an email address, bank details, posts on social 
networking websites, medical information, or a computer IP address”, see EU Commission, ‘The EU Data 
Protection Reform and Big Data’ (January 2016). 
11 Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, Solidarity in biomedicine and beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), 11; Henry Pearce, ‘A systems approach to data protection law and policy in the world of big data?’ 
(2016) 22(4) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 90-93. 
12 Gartner IT glossary, ‘Big data’ as cited by the UK Information Commissioner Office, who have conceded that 
this definition based on the three v’s (volume, velocity and variety) has been described as tired through over-use 
and can be problematic as multiple forms of data do not share the same traits. They supplement it by noting that it 
“is useful to regard it as data which, due to several varying characteristics, is difficult to analyse using traditional 
data analysis methods” Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Big data, artificial intelligence, machine learning 
and data protection’ (September 2017) Version 2.2 <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf.> accessed 8th April 2019, 6.  
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efficiency and effectiveness in fostering healthy habits/practices, 13  to enable more precise 
prediction and more successful prevention of disease, and aid the development of medical 
interventions, 14  both from a commercial point of view as well as from a public health 
perspective. Artificial intelligence15 and machine learning16 techniques are useful to accelerate 
these benefits and fully “unlock the value of big data”.17 Personal data– understood, in line with 
Art. 4 of the GDPR as information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, play 
important roles in this endeavour. 
 
At the same time, traditional distinctions drawn by data governance frameworks, such as the 
distinctions between identified (or identifiable) and anonymous data,18 and between sensitive 
                                                 
Some have also discussed definitions based on four and five v’s adding value and veracity, see: Jonathan Shaw, 
‘Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal: Information Science Promises to Change the World’, Harv. Mag. (Mar.-Apr. 
2014) <http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal> accessed 21 May 2018; Steve Lohr, 
‘The Age of Big Data’, NY Times (Feb. 11, 2012)  <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-
datas-impact-in-the-world.html > accessed 21 May 2018; Svetlana Sicular, ‘Gartner’s Big Data Definition 
Consists of Three Parts, Not to Be Confused with Three “V”s’ FORBES (Mar. 27, 2013) < 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2013/03/27/gartners-big-data-definition-consists-of-three-parts-not-
to-be-confused-with-three-vs/ > accessed 8th April 2019. See also Big Data, GARTNER  < 
https://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data / > accessed 8th April 2019; Chris Forsyth, ‘For Big Data Analytics 
There’s No Such Thing as Too Big: The Compelling Economics and Technology of Big Data Computing’, 
4SYTHCOMM.COM (Mar. 2012), <https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/data-center-
virtualization/big_data_wp.pdf > .as cited in  TZ Zarsky, ‘Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data’  (2018) 
47 Seton Hall Review 995, 999. 
13 Fabrico F Costa ‘Big Data in biomedicine’ (2014) 19(4) Drug Discovery Today 433–440. 
14 Charles Auffray et al, ‘Making sense of big data in health research: Towards an EU action plan’ (2016) 71(8) 
Genomic Medicine 1-13, 3. 
15 Defined as “…the analysis of data to model some aspect of the world. Inferences from these models are then 
used to predict and anticipate possible future events” in Government Office for Science, Artificial intelligence: 
opportunities and implications for the future of decision making, (9 November 2016) as cited by Information 
Commissioner’s Office, Big data, artificial intelligence, machine learning and data protection (September 2017) 
Version 2.2., 6. 
16 Defined as “the set of techniques and tools that allow computers to ‘think’ by creating mathematical algorithms 
based on accumulated data” in Deb Landau, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning: How Computers Learn. 
iQ (17 August 2016) < as cited in the Information Commissioner’s Office, Big data, artificial intelligence, machine 
learning and data protection (September 2017) Version 2.2., 7. 
17Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Big data, artificial intelligence, machine learning and data protection’ 
(September 2017) Version 2.2, 8  
18On the difficulties in anonymisation in big data era, see: Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, Solidarity in 
biomedicine and beyond. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 11. See also: Graeme Laurie & Leslie 
Stevens, ‘Developing a Public Interest Mandate for the Governance and Use of Administrative Data in the United 
Kingdom’ (2016) 44(3) Journal of Law and Society 360-392, 368 citing the following: P. Ohm, ‘Broken Promises 
of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization' (2009) 57 UCLA Law Rev. 1701; A. 
Narayanan & V. Shmatikov, `De-Anonymizing Social Networks' (2009) 30th IEEE Symposium on Security & 
Privacy, at <https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak09.pdf>;  P. Schwartz & D. Solove, `The PII Problem: 
Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information' (2011) 86 New York University Law Rev. 
1814; M. Gymrek et al., `Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference' (2013) 339 Science 321.  
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and non-sensitive data19 are increasingly difficult to operationalise in the big-data era given the 
increased sharing, copying, and linking of data and datasets, and because of the aforementioned 
multiplicity of digital data – the fact that they can be in more than one place at the same time. 
If combined with sufficient additional data and information, virtually any data point is 
identifiable. Moreover, data representing even the most innocuous kind of information could 
be used in conjunction with other data to reveal sensitive information thereby increasing the 
risk of harming people.20 It has been argued that, in the digital era, any data should be regarded 
as potentially identifiable, health-related, and sensitive.21 In addition, big data allows greater 
emphasis on ‘insights obtained at the aggregate level to be used to make probabilistic 
“predictions”’ about individuals and groups,22 leading to challenging questions about who gets 
to make – and further use – such predictions, for what purposes, and under which safeguards. 
 
B. The Problem: Challenges for the governance of human data left unaddressed by the GDPR  
 
The regulatory response to challenges posed by big data has tended towards the fossilisation, 
imitation or mimesis 23  of traditional concepts and instruments such as privacy, informed 
consent and risk management. Broadly speaking, it has so far sought to address challenges from 
big data use by trying to minimise and manage risks of data use as much as possible, and, at the 
same time, by attempting to increase individual control over how specific data types are used. 
                                                 
19 For a full discussion of sensitive data and difficulties of definition Stephanie OM Dyke, Edward S Dove, Bartha 
M Knoppers, ‘Sharing Health Related Data: a privacy test?’ (2016) NPJ Genomic Medicine; Jacob Metcalf, Emily 
F Keller and Danah Boyd, ‘Perspectives on Big Data, Ethics and Society’ The Council for Big Data, Ethics and 
Society (23rd May 2016) <http://bdes.datasociety.net/council-output/perspectives-on-big-data-ethics-and-
society/> accessed 8th April 2019. 
20 For the varied types and severity of harms which can be caused by big data see Joanna Reddan and Jessica 
Brand, ‘Data Harm Record’ <https://datajusticelab.org/data-harm-record/> accessed 8th April 2019. 
21 Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, Solidarity in biomedicine and beyond. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), 11. For an interesting discussion of these questions, see Miranda Mourby et al, ‘Are ‘pseudonymised’ 
data always personal data? Implications of the GDPR for administrative data research in the UK’ (2018) 34(2) 
Computer Law and Security Review 222-233. 
22 Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 
97. 
23 On the idea of mimesis see: G Laurie, ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research Regulation: What 
are we Missing in the Spaces In-between?’ (2017) Medical Law Review, 47-72, 58. 
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This has led to what some have termed ‘privacy protectionism’24 or a ‘whiplash effect’25 where 
‘overly restrictive measures (especially legislation and policies) are proposed in reaction to 
perceived harms, which overreact in order to re-establish the primacy of threatened values, such 
as privacy’.26At the societal level, an overt focus on risk management can increase burdens for 
data processing which has the potential to limit data uses, thereby hampering the potential 
benefits of big data - while such measures may not necessarily protect individuals either. 
 
In addition, at an individual level, focusing on risk management and relying on traditional 
concepts such as informed consent is problematic because it could give false assurances. Even 
with the highest safeguards and best intentions in place, no data usage in the digital age will 
ever be entirely risk-free;27 nor can there be a guarantee against predictive use of individual and 
collective health (and other) information in ways that can harm people. The emphasis put on 
increased individual control and risk minimisation in many current health data governance 
systems, as useful as this approach has been to date, is likely to also engender problematic 
expectations for data-subjects in the new ‘big data’ context, who may feel falsely assured that 
they have meaningful control over how their data are used.28 A more explicit focus on harms 
and harm mitigation, would be in line with the principle of veracity in the governance of 
personal data in the digital era.29 
 
                                                 
24 J. Allen, C.D.J. Holman, E.M. Meslin, F. Stanley, ‘Privacy protectionism and health information: any redress 
for harms to health?’ (2013) 21(2) J. Law Med. 473–485 as cited in K.H. Jones, G Laurie, L Stevens, C Dobbs, 
DV Ford, N Lea, ‘The other side of the coin: Harm due to the non-use of health-related data’ (2017) 97 
International Journal of Medical Informatics 43–51, 47. 
25 Brent Daniel Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘Introduction’ in The Ethics of Biomedical Big Data (Springer 
International Publishing, 2016), 1. 
26 Ibid, 1. 
27  See Joanna Reddan and Jessica Brand, ‘Data Harm Record’ https://datajusticelab.org/data-harm-record/  
accessed 8th April 2019; See also work of PERVADE group on pervasive nature of big data 
<https://pervade.umd.edu/> accessed 8th April 2019. 
28Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, Solidarity in biomedicine and beyond. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017) 115. 
29 Jeantine E Lunshof et al, ‘From genetic privacy to open consent’ (2008) 9(5) Nature Reviews Genetics 406-411. 
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More effective harm mitigation mechanisms are particularly important and timely also because 
big data usage can lead to harms that have so far not been recognised, such as those described 
in Paula’s and Mustafa’s case in the beginning of the article. Predictive analytics could also 
lead to poor consumer ratings which in turn result in the denial of mortgages; predictive health 
profiles could make finding employment more difficult or raise insurance premiums, etc. 30  
Studies have also shown the risks of ‘credit worthiness by association’31 such as where an 
individual’s credit card limit was reduced due to predictions based on repayment histories of 
other people who shopped in the same stores as he had.32 Importantly, harms can occur also 
when data processing is lawful, such as in Mustafa’s case, which is a situation that existing 
legal remedies do not address.33  
 
Legal systems have tried to adapt to some of the challenges posed by big data. At a European 
level, the GDPR under Recital 71 protects against the processing of data which causes 
discriminatory effects on people on the basis of “racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, 
religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation, or 
processing that results in measures having such an effect.” However, there are clear limitations 
to such measures given the way big data works. The Information Commissioner Office (UK) 
                                                 
30  See generally: Joanna Redden, ‘Six ways (and counting) that big data systems are harming society’ (7th 
December, 2017) The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/six-ways-and-counting-that-big-data-systems-
are-harming-society-
88660?utm_content=buffer0c4fa&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer> 
accessed 8th April 2019, which cites: Federal Trade Commission, ‘Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion?’ 
Understanding the Issues (January, 2016) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-
inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf> accessed 8th April 2019 ; Solon Barocas & 
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, (2016) 104 California Law Review 671; Danielle Keats Citron & 
Frank A Pasquale, ‘The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions’ (2014) 89 Washington Law 
Review 1. 
30 Joanna Redden, ‘Six ways (and counting) that big data systems are harming society’ (7th December, 2017) The 
Conversation <https://theconversation.com/six-ways-and-counting-that-big-data-systems-are-harming-society-
88660?utm_content=buffer0c4fa&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer> 
accessed 8th April 2019. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Julius, ‘Credit Scoring in the era of Big Data’ (2016) 18(1) Yale Journal of 
Law and Technology 148 http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/5 accessed 8th April 2019.. 
33 For a running record of data harm examples see https://datajusticelab.org/data-harm-record/. 
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has stated that big data analysts “will need to find ways to build discrimination detection into 
their machine learning systems to prevent such decisions being made in the first place”34 to 
comply with issues of accountability under GDPR. Given the way the technology works, not 
all potential discriminatory effects will be reasonably foreseeable to allow pre-emptive action.35 
 
The GDPR also gives natural persons the right not to be subjected to decisions based on 
profiling under certain circumstances. 36  There are, however, numerous exemptions, and 
limitations to this, discussed in further detail below.37 It is also noteworthy that the respective 
Articles of the GDPR (4(4), 9, 22; see also Recitals 71-2) do not protect individuals from their 
personal information being used for automated purposes per se; rather it protects them merely 
from being subjected to decisions based solely on such automated purposes, e.g. profiling, 
without human intervention.38 The result is that the prohibition can easily be bypassed by 
involving humans at some stage in a largely automated process of decision making, for example 
by signing off results suggested by an algorithm.39   
 
                                                 
34 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Big data, artificial intelligence, machine learning and data protection’ 
(September 2017) Version 2.2 <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-
and-data-protection.pdf.> accessed 8th April 2019, para 116. 
35 See discussion of risks of discrimination in: Rhoen and Feng, ‘Why the ‘Computer says no’: illustrating big 
data’s discrimination risk through complex systems science’ (2018) 8(2)(1) International Data Privacy Law 
140–159, 
36 Profiling, here, is defined in Art 4(4) of the GDPR as “any form of automated processing of personal data 
consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular 
to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, 
personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements” 
37 See also Michael Vaele & Lillian Edwards, ‘Clarity, surprises, and further questions in the Article 29 Working 
Party draft guidance on automated decision-making and profiling’ (2018) 34(2) Computer Law & Security Review 
398-404. 
38 Rita Heimes, ‘Top 10 operational impacts of the GDPR: Part 5 – Profiling’ The Privacy Advisor (20th January 
2016) <https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-5-profiling/> accessed 8th April 2019. 
39 Tal Z Zarsky, ‘Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data’ (2018) 47 Seton Hall Review 995, 1016-
1017. This can arguably be inferred from the discussion of automated decision-making in: Art 29 Working Party, 
Guidelines on Automated Individual decision-making and profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 
adopted on 3 February 2017 WP251.01 available at https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/W29-auto-
decision_profiling_02-2018.pdf  These guidelines were endorsed by the European Data Protection Board 
(EDPB) in May 2018 https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/European-Data-Protection-Board  
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Furthermore, under the GDPR, data can only be processed in line with the purpose it is collected 
for (purpose limitation),40 but subsequent processing is permissible provided it is compatible 
with this purpose. One such compatible purpose is processing for statistical purposes, however 
uncertainty remains around how this exception will apply in the big data context.41 To be 
deemed a statistical purpose the results should not be used “in support of measures or decisions 
regarding any particular natural person.”42 However, in practice it may be impossible to prevent 
data users to use findings from data analytics that identify an association (or even a causal 
connection43) between two parameters in such a way that they apply to specific individuals. 
 
Either as part of implementing the GDPR into their national legal systems, or additionally, 
many countries currently attempt to introduce legislation curbing or at least limiting the use of 
predictive analytics in health care systems.44 Although these solutions are a welcome step, they 
are not sufficient to address the problem described above for four reasons: First, potential harms 
caused by the use of data in this way often fall outside the remit of governance frameworks 
using traditional legal concepts.45 As demonstrated by Metcalf and other colleagues’ work on 
the pervasive nature of big data, harms are often systemic in nature and may have effects on 
multiple individuals downstream.46  For example, a person who is harmed by a predictive 
                                                 
40 Art 5(1)(b) GDPR and Art 6(4) GDPR. 
41 For a discussion of the likely difficulties this will pose for big data, see Zarsky, note 40, 1008; Antoinette 
Rouvroy, ““Of Data and Men”: Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in a World of Big Data”, Council of Europe 
Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law at 11 (Jan. 11, 2016). 
42 Recital 162, GDPR. See discussion in Zarsky, 1008; Antoinette Rouvroy, ““Of Data and Men”: Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms in a World of Big Data”, Council of Europe Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule 
of Law at 11 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTM 
Content?documentId=09000016806a6020 at 26; for an alternative view see Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Yann 
Padova, Regime Change? Enabling Big Data through Europe’s New Data Protection Regulation, (2016) 17 Colum. 
Sci. & Tech Law Rev.315 at 329 
43  Hernán, Miguel A., John Hsu, and Brian Healy. "Data science is science's second chance to get causal 
inference right: A classification of data science tasks." (2018) arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.10846. 
44 For example, see adapted German Data Protection Law.  
45 Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, Solidarity in biomedicine and beyond. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), 98. See also: Mark Taylor, Genetic data and the law: a critical perspective on privacy protections 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)  
46 See https://datajusticelab.org/data-harm-record/ ; See also work of  PERVADE group on pervasive nature of big 
data - https://pervade.umd.edu/, 
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analytics system that makes probabilistic inferences regarding an undesirable trait on the basis 
of generic information about her – such as the postcode she lives in – does not have access to 
legal remedies if the data that was used to make these inferences is not her own personal data. 
Second, even when it is clear that a particular harm must have resulted from a breach of the law 
– such as in the case of Paula described in the beginning of the article – individuals might not 
be able to prove the relevant causal link required for traditional tort based remedies to apply, or 
for the purposes of establishing a right to compensation under the GDPR. This is because 
multiple digital copies of datasets may exist whose movements cannot be traced, or because the 
pervasive nature of digital data may make it easier for data controllers or processers to prove 
they are not responsible for the event. Third, according to the GDPR, even when data controllers 
fail to take sufficient steps to avoid discrimination against people and, as a result, they can be 
held accountable for breach of the GDPR, existing frameworks impose penalties for mis- and 
abuse of data that are often too low to deter bad practice on the side of data controllers47 – and 
neither do they provide support for the data subjects that experienced the harm. And fourth, Art 
80 GDPR provides that non-profit bodies active in the privacy context can initiate claims of 
infringement by data subjects, and allows for the potential for group actions – if such bodies 
gather multiple claims on similar issues from data subjects.48 This measure could be used as a 
collective support mechanism for individuals, but shortfalls remain, namely: First, it will be left 
to each Member State to devise such mechanisms for non-profit actions in national jurisdictions 
                                                 
47  Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 91. Under the GDPR, organizations in breach of the GDPR 
can be fined up to 4% of annual global turnover or €20 Million (whichever is greater). However, whether this will 
be sufficient to deter mis/abuse remains to be seen. 
48See also Recital 142, GDPR. For a discussion see: Kellie O'Flynn, ‘Has the GDPR Opened the Door to Class 
Actions in Ireland?’ (27 August 2018) <https://www.williamfry.com/newsandinsights/news-
article/2018/08/27/has-the-gdpr-opened-the-door-to-class-actions-in-ireland > accessed 8th April 2019. The first 
such complaints under Art 80 GDPR were lodged by Max Schrems group ‘None of Your Business’ (NOYB) in 
May 2018. See https://noyb.eu/4complaints/ ; The actions were against Google, Facebook, WhatsApp and 
Instagram. The action against Google has led to a decision in January 2019 by CNIL (the French Data Protection 
Commission) fining Google 50million Euros; see https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-imposes-
financial-penalty-50-million-euros-against-google-llc 
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which could lead to variance of approaches; Second, such bodies would also still only be able 
to take actions based on the infringement of the GDPR.  
 
All these aspects underscore the need for a new body, namely an HMB. Such a body would 
complement regulation to police data controllers by focusing on supporting data subjects who 
were harmed by data use, irrespective of who caused the harm, of whether or not they are able 
to prove a causal connection, and irrespective of whether the action or omission that led to the 
harm was illegal.  
 
C. Why better harm mitigation is needed in the digital era 
Alongside other colleagues we thus argue that the current approach to data governance needs 
to change.49 In previous publications two of the authors of this article  (Barbara Prainsack and 
Alena Buyx),50 have argued that new approaches to big data governance should be based on the 
concept of solidarity,51 and that they should include three main pillars: (a) greater emphasis on 
whether or not specific instances of data use are in the public interest, (b) the strengthening of 
harm mitigation instruments, and (c) new legal mechanisms to ensure that significant parts of 
financial profits created on the basis of data use go into the public purse (e.g. via a corporate 
data use tax). In this article, we will focus on pillar (b) harm mitigation. As noted, the account 
                                                 
49See also: Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A 
Revolution that will transform how we live, work and think (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, 2013); Dana 
Boyd & Kate Crawford, ‘Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a cultural, technological and scholarly 
phenomenon’ (2012) 15(2) Information, Communication and Society 662-679; N. Kshetri, ‘The Emerging Role 
of Big Data in Key Development Issues: Opportunities, Challenges, and Concerns' (2014) 1 Big Data & Society; 
S. Barocas & H. Nissenbaum, ‘Big Data's End Run Around Anonymity and Consent’ in J Lane et al (eds), Privacy, 
Big Data, and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement,  (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Paul Ohm, 
‘Changing the Rules: General Principles for Data Use and Analysis’ in J Lane et al (eds), Privacy, Big Data, and 
the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement  (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
50Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, ‘A solidarity-based approach to the governance of research biobanks’ (2013) 
21(1) Medical Law Review 71-91; Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine and Beyond 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017) 
51 For a definition, see Prainsack, Barbara, and Buyx, Alena, ‘Thinking ethical and regulatory frameworks in 
medicine from the perspective of solidarity on both sides of the Atlantic’ 37 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 
489-501 at 493; see also: Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine and Beyond (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). 
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of harm mitigation that we develop in the following sections can be adapted to, and support, 
the governance of any data use, not limited to health, and within any kind of regulatory and 
governance landscape. In other words, although the idea of harm mitigation bodies (HMBs) 
and their accompanying financial support mechanisms was conceived in connection with 
solidarity-based governance,52 enhancing harm mitigation is an essential task in the era of 
digital data, irrespective of whether other instruments of solidarity-based governance are 
employed or not. 
 
We argue that there are important normative and practical rationales for establishing HMBs. 
At the normative level, harm mitigation forms a key step that governance frameworks need to 
shift towards, strengthening not only individual but also collective control and responsibility in 
the context of data use. We take it as a given, in the interests of social justice and fairness, that 
significant inequities in the distribution of benefits and burdens, as well as large power 
imbalances in societies, need to be remedied. Improved mechanisms and instruments of 
collective control and responsibility for data use are necessary to counteract the growing 
imbalances between those who give data and those who use them. Strengthening collective 
responsibility also includes improving the support of individuals and groups of people53 who 
are harmed by data use. And this, in turn, leads us to emphasise the need for better harm 
mitigation instruments.  
 
In our view, HMBs will help to protect people from the downstream costs – in the widest sense 
of the word – of personal data use in the digital era to a greater extent than is currently the case.  
                                                 
52  Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, ‘Thinking ethical and regulatory frameworks in medicine from the 
perspective of solidarity on both sides of the Atlantic’ (2016) 37 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 489-501; 
Barbara Prainsack, ‘Research for personalised medicine: Time for solidarity’ (2017) 36(1) Medicine and Law 87-
98; Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, ‘A solidarity-based approach to the governance of research biobanks. 
(2013) 21(1) Medical Law Review 71-91.  
53 Having said this, we anticipate group claims to be the exception. Furthermore, depending on size of group, they 
may already have collective agency to a certain extent, so such issues are likely to be resolved more quickly by a 
data controller than cases of individual harm in order to maintain the public image/legitimacy of the data controller. 
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For individuals, big data entails upfront costs (the costs related to curating and using datasets, 
which they share with public and private corporations that provide the technologies and 
infrastructures for the generation of data) and downstream costs in terms of harms caused by 
data use. Under current regulatory frameworks, as described, these downstream costs for data 
use in the digital era are carried largely by individual members of the public and by publics, 
whereas the commercial benefits unfold mostly for such privately owned corporations. HMBs 
would seek to reduce the downstream costs for individuals/publics, and thus contribute to a 
mitigation of imbalances in power and benefits and burdens between publics and private actors. 
While this is not an argument against private corporations making profits from personal data 
use in principle, the difference in power, agency, and costs borne by corporations that use data 
on the one hand, and the people who contribute data on the other, is a problem in need of 
addressing. In some of our other work,54 we have suggested solutions to ensure that a larger 
share in profits come back into the public domain (e.g. via a data tax). These monies paid by 
corporations benefitting from the use of people’s data could and should be used to support the 
operation of HMBs.  
 
There is also a practical rationale for HMBs: we argue that HMBs are practically mandated 
because no matter how hard we try to reduce risks emerging from novel ways of data use, some 
individuals and groups will still inevitably be harmed by these practices, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, and both by legal and illegal data use. As noted, existing legal remedies,55 
which only protect from the downstream costs of data use which is unlawful e.g. infringes the 
GDPR,56 and (in some cases) only if those harmed can prove a causal connection between an 
                                                 
54   Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, ‘Thinking ethical and regulatory frameworks in medicine from the 
perspective of solidarity on both sides of the Atlantic’ (2016) 37 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 489-501; 
Barbara Prainsack, ‘Research for personalised medicine: Time for solidarity.’ (2017) 36(1) Medicine and Law 87-
98. 
55 For example, the tort of misuse of private information in the United Kingdom, or data subjects’ rights under 
chapter 3 GDPR and remedies in cases of unlawful processing article 8 GDPR.  
56 Furthermore, scenarios could potentially arise where fines were imposed for breach of GDPR processes, but 
individual would not necessarily obtain compensation unless infringement leads to damage. 
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act or omission by a specific entity and the harm incurred, are not sufficient to address this 
problem. Further difficulties stem from the fact that costs often arise not only for primary data 
subjects but for third parties, i.e., for other individuals downstream.57  To address these issues 
on a practical level, we need an instrument ancillary to traditional legal mechanisms, with an 
explicit focus on harm mitigation. For this system to be effective, it must be easy for people to 
use, very low on bureaucracy, and flexible enough in its decision-making system to support 
people where and how they most need it.    
 
Moreover, although it might be possible that other avenues could be developed to address the 
issues described, such as strict liability for data mis-use or any use which causes harm, it is well 
known by now that serious harms can stem from data use that does not break any laws. While 
the harm experienced by Mustafa in the beginning of the article could be seen as very minor, 
other legal practices can cause serious harms, without effective and accessible legal remedies 
being available to those harmed: A man whose driver’s license was revoked after facial 
recognition technology wrongfully ‘identified’ his photograph as similar to another license 
holder and there was suspicion of identity fraud. 58 Another person who typed something into 
Google that the company’s autocomplete function added the word ‘bomb’ to, who was visited 
by government investigators and lost his job as a result. In both cases,59 serious harm occurred 
without either of the men having access to effective legal remedies to provide financial support 
for the harm suffered.60  
                                                 
57 See also PERVADE project <https://pervade.umd.edu/about/data-ethics-regulators/> accessed 8th April 2019.   
58 See discussion in Luke Dormehl, ‘Algorithms are great and all but they can also ruin lives’ (Wired, 19 
November, 2014) available at https://www.wired.com/2014/11/algorithms-great-can-also-ruin-lives/ (<accessed 
8th April 2019> 
59 See discussion of these and other similar cases in L Dormehl, The Formula: How Algorithms Solve all our 
Problems ... and Create More (Random House, 2014). 
60  The victim of the facial recognition mistake was told by authorities that he had the right to request a hearing 
but the onus was upon him to prove his identity if he wanted his licence restored. The hearing was held 11 days 
after the licence suspension where he submitted relevant documentation and his licence was reinstated. 
Nonetheless, the fact the licence was suspended in the first place due to algorithmic misidentification caused 
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We argue that a harm mitigation model is the most appropriate in the context described. This is 
because it could operate flexibly and would offer an important balance of supporting individuals 
who may suffer harms and seeking to limit these harms, regardless of whether these harms stem 
from legal or illegal data uses, and irrespective of whether the harmed individuals can prove a 
causal connection between a specific act or omission and the harm incurred. Furthermore, the 
more informal nature of HMBs, as laid out in the following, may help to address the problem 
that it is often the most socio-economically deprived groups that are most likely to be harmed 
by data uses. These groups regularly have fewer resources (both in terms of financial resources 
and access to legal advice) to avail themselves of traditional legal remedies and mount legal 
challenges against particular data uses, thus potentially further worsening the aforementioned 
imbalances. Finally, the HMB model would provide an avenue for individuals (and groups) to 
feed issues of big data usage back to regulators, thus forming an important element of reflexive 
governance.61 This is vital given the evolving nature of data uses, and how, relatively, little we 
know at this point about the nature and severity of harms that stem from these uses, as well as 
their prevalence and distribution within and across populations.  
 
II: HARM MITIGATION BODIES: FUNCTIONS AND LEGAL ADAPTATIONS 
 
This section introduces HMBs and expands on their main functions in reference to the GDPR 
to highlight the complementary nature HMBs could play in addressing gaps in existing 
                                                 
unnecessary harm for him. His subsequent claim for damages based on the incident against the Register for Motor 
Vehicles was rejected. See Gass v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles 12-P-205 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 7, 2013). The fired 
employee who wanted to build a radio-controlled airplane and was accused of trying to build a bomb subsequently 
commenced expensive litigation to try to claim compensation for the job loss suffered. 
61 For a discussion of reflexive governance see: G Laurie, ‘Reflexive governance in biobanking: on the value of 
policy led approaches and the need to recognise the limits of law’ (2011) 130(3) Human Genetics 347; S Harmon, 
G Laurie, G Haddow, ‘Governing risk, engaging publics and engendering trust: New horizons for law and social 
science? ‘(2013) 40(1) Science and Public Policy 25. 
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frameworks. We expect these ideas to be developed further over time by and in response to the 
community within which HMBs would operate and apply. 
 
A. Introducing Harm Mitigation Bodies 
We envisage HMBs as instruments that specifically address harms to individuals that are 
plausibly connected to data use. HMBs have two primary functions, namely: (1) to provide 
financial support to individuals who can plausibly make a case that they suffered significant 
and undue harm by data use (without needing to prove wrongdoing or direct legal causation 
due to an acknowledgment that this is increasingly not possible in the era of digital data); and 
(2) to monitor harms reported as being caused by big data practices reported to and within 
HMBs. This information can then be fed back to data controllers and to public agencies and 
inform how the operation of systems of data governance could be improved. 
 
HMBs would be established at national levels, for example as independent statutory arms of 
national data protection bodies.62 They would have oversight for data uses pertaining to all data 
controllers resident (in the case of individuals) or established (in the case of corporate entities) 
in that national jurisdiction. All data controllers established in a country in question would need 
to sign up to the national HMB and pay a certain percentage of their profits (in case of for-profit 
entities) or their funding (in case of non-profit entities) to the HMB. HMBs would use these 
funds to cover their operating costs, and to establish a financial support mechanism from which 
people harmed by data use could make individual petitions to. HMBs would have a reporting 
branch and an investigative branch. The latter would also deal with petitions for financial and 
                                                 
62 Similar types of funds can be seen when one looks to landlord risk mitigation funds – these are funds used to 
encourage landlords to rent to ‘higher’ risk tenants such as those with lower incomes or with previous evictions, 
and in some cases used to tackle issues of homelessness whereby if damages occur landlords are reimbursed up to 
a specified limit. See Katy Miller, ‘Using Incentives to Engage Landlords: Risk Mitigation Funds’ 15th April 2016  
<https://www.usich.gov/news/using-incentives-to-engage-landlords-risk-mitigation-funds> accessed 8th April 
2019. 
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other support provided for by the fund(s). The two branches would communicate and coordinate 
with each other, and indeed a central role of the individual petition system would be to provide 
information to the HMB about the nature and severity of experienced harms. This information 
could be used to assess patterns of harms caused by data uses and inform policy around good 
practice for big data.  
 
To respond adequately to individual petitions, there would be multiple investigation panels 
within the HMB governed by a group of people who are independent from the data controller(s). 
This group – the steering committee – would consist of legal and data protection experts, but 
also include lay members, to ensure a varied membership and reduce the potential for regulatory 
or institutional capture. There would also be an appeal board within the HMB, where rejected 
petitions to the financial support mechanism could be appealed to and considered.  
 
Individual Petition Procedure 
 
Anyone who perceives that they experienced significant and undue harm by data use – either 
through the legal or illegal use of their own data, or somebody else’s data63 - and who wishes 
to report this, and/or who wishes to apply for financial support can do so via an informal 
individual petition submitted to the HMB. The petition will be assigned to an investigative 
panel within the HMB which will conduct a first review of the case to establish whether the 
case has the potential on the balance of probabilities to meet three requirements. These 
                                                 
63 This is important also in the context of predictive analytics, where the analysis of other people’s data can lead 
to the detection of patterns of undesirable characteristics that are then applied to a specific person; and if the person 
has this undesirable characteristic she can experience harm as a result. This mechanism is not new – it has existed 
in actuarial reasoning in insurance, criminal law, etc., for a long time. But the availability of wider sets of digital 
data covering more aspects of people’s lives, and the rapid advance of computational tools and methods increase 
the scale of this problem. See: work on rights of secondary data subjects, including: Mark Taylor, Genetic data 
and the law: a critical perspective on privacy protections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
 
 21 
requirements are that (a) the claimed harm is significant, that it is (b) undue and (c) that there 
is a plausible connection between the harm arising and the data use.  
 
If these criteria have the potential to be met then the HMB would invite the applicant to provide 
further information, which the HMB then uses to make a decision on: (a) whether the case does 
indeed include significant harm to the applicant. Here we take significant harms to be those that 
would be considered significant to a reasonable person in the individual’s position, or harms 
that a data controller could reasonably foresee that a particular data subject would consider to 
be significant. We adopt this hybrid subjective/objective test in recognition of the fact that the 
impact of a particular harm suffered is dependent on the personal characteristics and factors 
relating to the data subject. The assessment of (b) whether harm is undue depends on whether 
it can be justified by a legal requirement that can be considered fair. For example, if an 
individual experienced harm on the basis of being included in a criminal investigation on lawful 
grounds, and these grounds are fair in that they do not include an implicit bias against certain 
groups of people (e.g. penalising practices that are associated with poverty, for example), this 
harm would not be considered undue. Similarly, harm might not be undue if somebody signed 
up to a web service in full knowledge that the web service did not adhere to good data practice 
standards (if no laws were broken). While these are examples of considerations that would have 
bearing on the decision, whether or not a specific instance of harm is undue, including the 
fairness criterion, must be assessed on a case by case basis by the HMB. Discretion, we argue, 
is needed, because HMBs should be flexible to respond to harms stemming from big data 
practices which are still being uncovered, and which we cannot list in an exhaustive sense at 
the outset. Therefore, to maintain a responsive HMB system we cannot, a priori, prescribe a 
detailed framework for the assessment of harms. To mitigate against potential risks arising from 
such discretion, we envisage there being strong procedural transparency around how HMBs 
make decisions. This acts as a counterbalance to the lack of stringent a priori prescriptive rules 
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to determine the significance of harm, which will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Once 
HMBs have been in place for several years it will then be possible to revisit the framework for 
assessing harms, and to distil greater guidelines around what should be considered a significant 
harm. 
 
Finally, (c) whether it is plausible to assume a connection between the harm and specific 
instances of data use - this is a lower standard than would be employed within traditional legal 
remedies, and entails proving whether a reasonable person would view on the balance of 
probabilities that it was plausible that the harm could have resulted (but not proving that it 
necessarily did result) from the data use outlined. 
 
When first established, we suggest HMB petitions would be confined to claims from natural 
persons. This is because HMBs are envisaged to mitigate harms for individuals and addressing 
power imbalances which arise between individuals and data controllers. Nonetheless, in saying 
this, we acknowledge that power imbalances may also negatively affect small and medium 
sized enterprises. Therefore, once established for natural persons and operating well in this 
context, at a later point the role of HMBs might be revisited to consider whether it would be 
feasible to expand to cover claims from such entities. 
 
In terms of what types of harm(s) we expect people to report, this could be discrimination, 
stigma, or the loss of income following unauthorised re-identification.64 But harm can also 
occur without undue re-identification of data, and even without any data having been taken 
from the person who was harmed. The practice of predictive analytics, for example, uses 
                                                 
64 Re-identification is usually understood as the attempt to match anonymised or de-identified data with publicly 
available information/data to discover the individual to which the data belongs to. It has been shown that it is 
possible to re-identify even data that was previously believed to have been stripped of any identifying information. 
See Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, ‘A solidarity-based approach to the governance of research biobanks’ 
(2013) 21(1) Medical Law Review 71-91. 
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insights from one group of people to discern patterns that will then be applied on other groups 
of people. As a result, those with ‘risky’ or otherwise undesirable characteristics can be 
excluded from certain offers or services, or they can become a target for heightened scrutiny or 
surveillance (e.g. patients who are identified to be particularly likely to overuse emergency 
rooms on the basis of predictive analytics).65 Whenever such harms do not give grounds to a 
claim within data protection or tort law systems, because they are lawful, or because it is 
impossible for affected parties to prove what act or omission exactly caused the harm (e.g. due 
to data having been used by many different bodies and having been analysed in ways that are 
not open to scrutiny), individuals could be encouraged to approach a HMB.66  
 
Alternatively, some people may wish to report harms they have experienced which they think 
are due to data use but may not wish to seek financial or other support, e.g. if the harm 
experienced is not significant but they still want it recorded and its causes addressed to prevent 
possible harms to others. A simple, informal feedback form would be set up for this purpose 
and would enable the HMB to fulfil an important monitoring role. This informal process could 
be used to prompt investigations for HMBs and if harms were found to be significant and 
repeated, findings could feed into regulatory frameworks to address these harms. To increase 
public knowledge of the potential for harms arising from data use, public awareness campaigns 
would need to be established by the government to educate the public, so they can identify 
possible harmful practices. 
 
                                                 
65 For an overview of such risks from data use, see, Pam Dixon & Robert Gellman ‘The Scoring of America: How 
Secret Consumer Scores Threaten Your Privacy and Your Future’ (2014) World Privacy Forum. 
<http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of_America_April2014_fs.pdf> accessed 8th April 2019. 
66 It could be considered to also allow individuals to appeal to the HMB if they can make plausible case that 
pursuing legal remedies would be too onerous or costly to be reasonably possible. 
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Importantly, HMBs would thus be subsidiary to rather than replace existing legal protections, 
thereby filling the aforementioned regulatory gaps created by the digital era. Regulators and 
data controllers would still be required to minimise risks as far as reasonable and practical. 
Alongside this, HMBs would be established that offer financial and/or other support to those 
who are harmed by data use but for instance the claimed harms suffered would not meet 
thresholds for legal causation under existing legal remedies – for example, because no direct 
causal link between an action of a data controller and the experienced harm could be proven. 
In this way, HMBs fill the existing gaps in traditional legal systems, whilst also serving an 
important reporting function as patterns of harms caused by data use investigated can then be 
assessed and issues identified and fed back to regulators. HMBs thereby seek to complement 
available legal remedies in mitigating potential negative effects of data use, and also by 
providing feedback to data controllers on how systems and procedures could be improved. In 
EU member states, HMBs would complement, rather than compete with or duplicate, the role 
of the relevant Data Protection Authority (DPA), which is the independent public authority in 
each state that supervises the application of data protection law. While the main role of the DPA 
is to police data controllers, and while they are limited to cases that infringe existing laws, 
HMBs main role would be to support data subjects, and they would not be limited to instances 
of unlawful data use. In this area, HMB could assist in collecting evidence on the frequency, 
nature, and severity of harms occurring, and by analysing this information to help improve data 
protection, HMBs and DPAs could and should collaborate on this.  
 
B. Financial Support Function 
As noted, HMBs – particularly as an institution that people can appeal to also for financial 
support – do not aim to replace existing legal mechanisms for compensation or redress. Instead, 
they seek to complement legal systems by providing a low-threshold instrument for people who 
feel that the legal system did not, or cannot, address the harm that they suffered. HMBs could 
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make positive decisions on appeals even if data users did not infringe any laws or rules, and if 
HMBs gave financial support to applicants, these would not claim to provide full restitution or 
compensation for all losses resulting from the harm. In cases where the claimed harm could be 
quantified in financial terms, money paid out by HMBs would not claim to correspond with 
those figures either. Instead, money paid by HMBs would be understood as financial support, 
not necessarily corresponding with the extent of the actual harm. The amount provided would 
however aim to reflect the degree and type of harm suffered. In other words, the more 
significant the harm suffered, the higher the financial support offered. This would be assessed 
on a case by case basis. When the system is first set up, if concerns arose initially on the 
affordability of the system the financial supports offered could be set out as a percentage of 
losses/costs borne by the individual, e.g. 60% of actual loss/costs, which would reflect the fact 
that it is a supportive measure to the individual. It also reflects the informal nature of system 
which does not require legal costs, requires a minimal application process in terms of the data 
subject etc. 
 
Liability under the HMB model is on a no-fault basis such that financial support is not 
dependent on proving a violation of law by the data controller. Instead it is based on proving a 
plausible connection between the actions (legal or illegal) of the data controller and the harm 
suffered. As noted, awards could be made from HMBs even if the actions of the data controller 
did not fall foul of any laws, which addresses concerns raised elsewhere on the need to have 
broader systems of accountability for data uses in the biomedical context.67 In this way, HMBs 
are distinctly different from traditional constructions of liability e.g. in tort law where liability 
is generally premised on a breach of duty and standard of care, with a direct proof of causation 
between the act in question and harm arising. Instead, in the HMB context, if an individual 
                                                 
67 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘The collecting. linking and use of biomedical research and health care: ethical 
issues’ (April 2014), [4.46]. 
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experienced harm, they could appeal to an HMB which would assess whether financial support 
is warranted based on the abovementioned criteria. In theory, claims could also be made in 
cases where data controllers’ actions were not unlawful.  
 
Three key legal questions arise under this framework, namely: (a) definition and construction 
of harm for the purposes of the HMB; (b) the subsidiary nature of HMBs and how the system 
is also designed to address harms falling outside existing protections, (c) in cases where the 
response of an HMB takes the form of support including e.g. financial payments, how the 
amount of financial support would be awarded. Taking each of these aspects in turn, the 
following can be said: 
 
1. Definition and construction of harm for purposes of HMB 
This section uses the European data protection framework as a case study to illustrate how the 
conception of ‘harm’ in HMBs differs from existing legal frameworks under the GDPR and the 
previous framework under the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. The precise role and 
influence of the GDPR over UK data protection laws after the UK leaves the EU is still 
uncertain, and will depend on the outcome of any Brexit deal.68 Nonetheless, as of May 2018 
the GDPR applies directly also in the UK until it leaves the EU likely later in 2019, and even 
after that transitional measures are still being negotiated. Furthermore, the UK’s Data 
Protection Act 2018 came into effect in May 2018. This Act replaces the previous Data 
Protection Act 1998, applies GDPR standards and complements the GDPR by setting out 
                                                 
68 This position is correct at time of writing 8th April 2019.If the UK leaves without a deal the GDPR will cease 
to operate in its current form, however, measures including the Draft Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (Amendments etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019  have been drafted in the UK which require 
governmental approval,  but which seek to further align UK data protection laws with the GDPR post-Brexit. This 
would allow the UK to apply to the European Commission for an adequacy decision on UK laws on whether they 
provide adequate protection for personal data in line with the GDPR. See discussion at Kingsley Napley, ‘GDPR 
for the UK: Brexit and international transfers of personal data’ (Lexology, 9th January 2019) 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=78e1c762-5c01-47d1-aa35-d2cff2e8991a  
 27 
specific rules to supplement its application in the UK. Therefore, the domestic Act will ensure 
continued application of provisions contained therein which are related to the GDPR in the UK 
post-Brexit. Moreover, even if the GDPR does not apply directly within the UK post-Brexit, 
the territorial scope of the GDPR is broader than the previous Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC, and the GDPR applies to all data controllers/processers who are processing personal 
data of individuals resident in the EU, which is regardless of the controllers/processers place of 
establishment. Given the proximity of the UK to EU markets, this is still likely to apply to many 
UK data controllers/processers. This section briefly sets out the relevant provisions and 
remedies provided previously by the Data Protection Directive 1995 (by reference to how these 
were applied in the UK under the Data Protection Act 1998) considering how the GDPR 
improves upon these, and also noting the gaps remaining. 
 
The UK’s Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998, which brought the EU Data Protection Directive 
1995 into national law, stipulated that harms from data use/mis-use were legally sanctionable 
under UK law if recognised under the relevant statute (DPA). Other legal actions were also 
relevant in this context, e.g. data use/mis-use may be subject to common law action for breach 
of confidentiality or tort of misuse of private information; or it may in some cases breach rights 
under the European Convention of Human Rights, of most relevance here is Art 8 (right to 
respect for private and family life).69 Data controllers who did not abide by standards set out in 
the DPA 1998 were liable to sanctions. However, the threshold required to prove harm and the 
penalties imposed when harm was established left gaps for data subjects. For example, the 
                                                 
69 Graeme Laurie et al, ‘A Review of Evidence Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health and Biomedical 
Data’, Report for Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working Party on Biological and Health Data and the Wellcome 
Trust’s Expert Advisory Group on Data Access (June 2014) http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-
content/uploads/FINAL-Report-on-Harms-Arising-from-Use-of-Health-and-Biomedical-Data-30-JUNE-
2014.pdf accessed 21 May, 2018, 28. See also discussion in: Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the 
concept of personal data 01248/07/EN WP 136 available at https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf at 18. 
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penalties imposed were arguably not severe enough to effectively deter data misuse. 70 
Moreover, and importantly in the context of big data, the provisions of the DPA 1998 did not 
apply to anonymous data, so no legal remedies were available if the use of anonymous data 
caused harm. The GDPR improves this situation by expanding the concept of personal data to 
include (at least some instances of) ‘pseudonymised data’, i.e. data that is neither anonymous 
nor identifying,71 whereby one attribute in data (usually a unique identifier) is replaced with 
another as an extra security measure to reduce the risk that the data subject can be identified.72 
It thereby extends the potential for legal remedies for individuals who did not have access to 
them under the Data Protection Directive.73 It remains to be seen, however, how this will be 
implemented in practice.74 Also, the GDPR does not include fully anonymous data (i.e. data 
where it is assumed that no link to specific individuals can be made)75 under the remit of 
personal data and thus leaves those who are harmed by the use of such data without redress. 
Furthermore, in distinguishing between anonymised and pseudonymised data a key question 
will be whether the risk of reidentification is reasonable,76 which could provide a potential gap 
                                                 
70 For a discussion, see (Out-Law.com, ‘Jail sentence penalties for data breaches will be consulted on despite 
Government's scepticism’ (11 October 2013)  <https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2013/October/jail-sentence-
penalties-for-data-breaches-will-be-consulted-on-despite-governments-scepticism/> accessed 8th April 2019; Out-
Law.com, ‘Review of UK data protection: Should fines go over half a mil?’  Out-Law 6 March 2014 
<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/03/06/uk_review_of_data_protection_sanctions_threshold/> accessed 8 th 
April 2019. 
71 Miranda Moubray et al, ‘Are ‘pseudonymised’ data always personal data? Implications of the GDPR for 
administrative data research in the UK’ (2018) 34(2) Computer Law and Security Review 222-233. 
72 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ 10 April 2014,  0829/14/EN 
WP216 at  20 
73 Graeme Laurie et al, ‘A Review of Evidence Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health and Biomedical 
Data’, Report for Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working Party on Biological and Health Data and the Wellcome 
Trust’s Expert Advisory Group on Data Access (June 2014), 33. 
74 For instance, Graeme Laurie et al, ‘A Review of Evidence Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health and 
Biomedical Data’, Report for Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working Party on Biological and Health Data and the 
Wellcome Trust’s Expert Advisory Group on Data Access (June 2014), 34 who state at footnote 50 that “…there 
is concern over how the Regulation would impact (negatively) upon the processing of personal data for health and 
biomedical purposes. The Wellcome Trust has consistently opposed drafts of the GDPR, which purport to turn 
pseudonymous data into a subset of personal data that would interfere with publicly beneficial research from being 
carried out.”  
75 Information that ‘‘does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to data rendered anonymous 
in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable’. 
76 Gabe Maldoff, ‘Top 10 operational impacts of the GDPR: Part 8 – Pseudonymization’ (12th February 2016) 
https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-8-pseudonymization/ accessed 8th April 
2019. 
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in protection, depending on how ‘reasonable’ is interpreted in such contexts, and particularly 
given ongoing advances in technology. 77 
 
More generally, Graeme Laurie et al previously highlighted the narrow framing of harm under 
the DPA 1998 whereby individuals had to prove that harm experienced by them caused either 
financial damage or distress (emotional suffering) and that this was of a sufficient degree to 
constitute a breach of the DPA 1998. 78  Under the GDPR, recital 82 provides a right to 
compensation for any person who suffered “material or non-material damage as a result of an 
infringement of this Regulation”, and compensation can be obtained from the data controller or 
the processor. There is no definition of non-material damage, however, recital 85 GDPR 
provides guidance, defining potential harms as: 
“physical, material or non-material damage to natural persons such as loss of control 
over their personal data or limitation of their rights, discrimination, identity theft or 
fraud, financial loss, unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation, damage to reputation, 
loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy or any other 
significant economic or social disadvantage to the natural person concerned.”79 
 
It remains to be seen how such definitions of damage/harm will be applied under the GDPR in 
practice, but arguably, although broader than the DPD by the inclusion of non-material damage, 
                                                 
77 There is a recognition that as technology develops data which has previously been annoymised, may become 
identifiable. The Irish Data Protection Commission states : “likely that more advanced data processing techniques 
than currently exist will be developed in the future that may diminish any current anonymisation techniques. It is 
also likely that more data sets will be released into the public domain, allowing for cross comparison between 
datasets. Both of these developments will make it more likely that individual records can be linked between 
datasets in spite of any anonymisation techniques employed, and ultimately that individuals can be identified.”  
See https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/guidance-landing/anonymisation-and-pseudonymisation  Reasonable 
measures must be taken against reidentification, but arguably this could not extend to pre-empting future specific 
technological advances. 
78 Graeme Laurie et al, ‘A Review of Evidence Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health and Biomedical 
Data’, Report for Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working Party on Biological and Health Data and the Wellcome 
Trust’s Expert Advisory Group on Data Access (June 2014), 3B and 3B3. 
79 See also recital 75; Art 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Personal data breach notification under Regulation 
2016/679 ‘ Adopted on 3 October 2017 (Revised and Adopted on 6 February 2018) at p. 6 
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they could retain a relatively narrow construction in practice. Art 82(3) also provides an 
exemption for controllers/processers from liability if they can prove that they are “not in any 
way responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.”  
 
 
In contrast to this approach – and in addition to the aforementioned differences between HMBs 
and DPA acting under the remit of the GDPR– HMBs would seek to employ a broad definition 
and application of harm arising from data-use. 80  HMBs would recognise physical, 
psychological and financial harms experienced by individuals if on the balance of probabilities, 
it is plausible that this harm is connected to data use. Instead of looking towards a strict 
traditional legal classification of harm which generally relies on causality to the loss suffered, 
the HMB (a) would adopt a lower threshold to prove causality such that the individual need 
only prove there is a plausible link between the harm suffered and the data use(s). It would also 
not need to be a proven link between an action by a specific data controller and the harm. 
Instead, in recognition of the pervasive nature of data, it would be enough to prove a plausible 
link between multiple data uses and harm arising. (b) Drawing on Laurie et al’s findings and 
recommendations,81 HMBs would look at harm in the sense of how individuals were ‘impacted’ 
                                                 
80 For a discussion of cases on this, under the previous DPA and limits on see, Graeme Laurie et al, ‘A Review of 
Evidence Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health and Biomedical Data’, Report for Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics Working Party on Biological and Health Data and the Wellcome Trust’s Expert Advisory Group on Data 
Access (June 2014), 7B1F; See also: K.H. Jones, G Laurie, L Stevens, C Dobbs, DV Ford, N Lea, ‘The other side 
of the coin: Harm due to the non-use of health-related data’ (2017) 97 International Journal of Medical Informatics 
43–51. 
81Graeme Laurie et al, ‘A Review of Evidence Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health and Biomedical 
Data’, Report for Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working Party on Biological and Health Data and the Wellcome 
Trust’s Expert Advisory Group on Data Access (June 2014), 161 who state: “To capture this, our soft evidence 
base conceptualised the notion of ‘impact’ arising from data use. Thus, for example, an individual might 
experience an impact if her/his data are used without permission, even if this is perfectly legal. Equally, 
organisations handling data might suffer an impact in trust and allegiance if individuals or groups whose data are 
held and used perceive an adverse impact through uses of which they disapprove. This is not to suggest that 
groundless concerns or abstract fears should drive information governance practices. Rather –as our soft evidence 
base suggests – the range of considerations about what might be construed as harmful is far wider than the law 
alone recognises. As such, the lesson is that due attention should be paid to possible impacts when using health 
and biomedical data, and to ensuring that governance mechanisms and actors within them have the ability to assess 
and, where appropriate, respond to data subjects’ expectations.” 
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by data use when assessing the significance of the harm looking at the extent to which this was 
harmful to that individual(s). This broader classification and application of harm is needed to 
support individuals in an era where decisions are increasingly supported – or even driven – by 
data. Also, whilst Art 82(1) refers to compensation being awarded based on “damage suffered” 
HMBs could go beyond this because the financial support that HMBs can offer are not limited 
to damage suffered but extend to other harms. Furthermore, although harms arising outside the 
GDPR, may be actionable in other ways, e.g. as breaches of human rights under the ECHR, 
HMBs provide a more expedient and less costly way for individuals to report and request 
support for such harms.82  
 
Nonetheless, as noted above, the HMB system is complementary to existing legal protections 
under data protection frameworks and is expected to be used by individuals who do not have 
claims under traditional legal remedies. For instance, the HMB would take claims which fell 
outside the scope of current laws where e.g. harm resulted from anonymised data; where harm 
resulted to a secondary data subject, or where harm occurred from lawful data use. In such 
cases, affected individuals could bring a petition to the HMB. However, to avoid duplication, 
although individuals who have a traditional claim are not barred from applying to the HMB, 
individuals are not be able to appeal to HMBs if other legal actions are in progress e.g. human 
rights claims or claims under the GDPR.  Instead, if a legal claim started in the course of a 
petition to the HMB, a stay on the petition would operate until the legal action was concluded. 
The HMB could then continue to consider the petition. However, as it is intended as a support 
mechanism for individuals and does not act as compensation, therefore if someone was 
compensated by the legal framework, the HMB petition would be unlikely to lead to further 
                                                 
82 In this respect, the administrative costs of running the HMB would be monitored particularly at the initial stages 
of the system and would need to adapt accordingly. For example, if it transpired that individuals were more inclined 
to use this informal HMB facility rather than look to traditional legal remedies then there would, for instance, need 
to be a percentage increase in the amount that each data controller would pay to the HMB.  
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financial rewards as that individual’s harm would already be financially mitigated against by 
law. Nonetheless, other supports might be granted to such individuals83 and petitions would 
also be used to inform the governance feedback loop created by HMBs. 
 
2. HMB Subsidiarity: Addressing harms falling outside existing protections. 
As mentioned, despite provisions in the GDPR which seek to address some of the challenges 
posed by big data, important gaps remain, which HMBs could help address. For example, as 
noted above, Art 22 (1) GDPR states that: 
 
the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on 
automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him 
or her or similarly significantly affects him or her. 
 
Where profiling is defined in Art 4 GDPR as:  
 
any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of using those data to 
evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or 
predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic 
situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or 
movements. 
 
However, the effect of the provision is limited by the fact that it refers only to processing of an 
individual’s ‘personal data’ used in a manner to ‘evaluate certain personal aspects’ relating to 
                                                 
83 Examples would include the recommendation by an HMB to reinstate credit worthiness that was negatively 
affected by association. 
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that person84  and is only applicable where there is no human intervention evident in the 
processing. Only fully automated data analytics fall within this, and those not fully automated 
– even if they include humans in an relatively insignificant manner, e.g. to sign off the decisions 
of the machine – do not fall within the remit of the protection (for further exceptions see 
below).85 As this article also relates to personal data as defined in the regulation it is unlikely - 
given the specific use of ‘that natural person’ in the article - that this would apply to data of 
individuals used to make predictions which impact upon a secondary data user.  Furthermore, 
the right does not apply if covered by the exceptions in Art 22(2) which allow automated 
processing if the decision is: necessary for the performance of a contract between data subject 
and controller; based on the data subject’s explicit consent; or if it is ‘authorised by Union or 
Member State law to which the controller is subject and which also lays down suitable measures 
to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests’.86 Whilst the Art 29 
Working Party guidance has highlighted limits placed on these caveats, such as having a narrow 
construction of necessity in the context of performance of a contract,87 nonetheless, the practical 
effect of Art 22 is significantly curtailed by such caveats.  
 
The GDPR also explicitly prohibits using sensitive data (or special categories of data) for 
automated decision-making purposes, unless the data controller has implemented measures to 
safeguard the data subject’s rights,88  and that the data subject has explicitly consented to 
                                                 
84 For a discussion of provisions see O Proust, ‘Getting to know the GDPR, Part 5: Your big data analytics and 
profiling activities may be seriously curtailed’ FieldFisher (4 December, 2015) 
<http://privacylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2015/getting-to-know-the-gdpr-part-5-your-big-data-analytics-and-
profiling-activities-may-be-seriously-curtailed/> accessed 8th April 2019. 
85 As noted above Art 29 Working Party guidance, endorsed by EDPB stated must be meaningful human action, 
not token. Art 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual decision-making and profiling for the 
purposes of Regulation 2016/679 adopted on 3 February 2017 WP251.01 at 21. 
86 Art 22(2)(b). 
87 Art 29 Working Party guidance, endorsed by EDPB stated must be meaningful human action, not token. Art 
29 Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual decision-making and profiling for the purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679 adopted on 3 February 2017 WP251.01 at 13. 
88 Sayers, Samantha & Drury-Smith, James (2016) “Legislative Comment: GDPR series: how to operationalise 
profiling for your organisation” 17(1) Privacy and Data Protection 3-6, 5. 
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processing, and the processing is for a legitimate aim.89 Nonetheless, this fails to address the 
fact that even with such safeguards in place, harm can still occur, in view of the aforementioned 
effect of big data where people do not know what actions exactly led to harm, and where they 
sometimes do not even know that data were used that proved harmful to them.90 Moreover, 
individuals may not have access to legal remedies, e.g. if it is a secondary data subject who is 
harmed.  
 
The GDPR also recognises the risk of discriminatory decision-making arising from profiling,91 
These include Recital 75 which recognises that algorithms can be used in a way that causes 
indirect discriminatory effects for certain individuals ‘even if those organisations had no 
knowledge of the discrimination and did not intend to discriminate”92 and legal protections 
against discrimination could be employed in such contexts. Guidance from the UK Information 
Commissioner’s Office emphasises the need for data controllers to take steps to prevent bias 
and discrimination resulting from profiling.93 However, in this context, the focus is again on 
the processing of ‘personal data’94 and the scope and effect of this provision in the ‘big data’ 
era remains to be seen. Moreover, as is well known, despite the GDPR’s goal to remove national 
differences in data protection standards, it leaves ample room for national derogations, and for 
different interpretations of key terms such as ‘public interest’ or ‘appropriate safeguards’. In 
                                                 
89 See Art 9(2)(a) and (g) as cited in Samantha Sayers and James Drury-Smith, ‘Legislative Comment: GDPR 
series: how to operationalise profiling for your organisation’ (2016) 17(1) Privacy and Data Protection 3-6, 5. 
90 Pam Dixon & Robert Gellman ‘The Scoring of America: How Secret Consumer Scores Threaten Your Privacy 
and Your Future’ (2014) World Privacy Forum. <http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of_America_April2014_fs.pdf> accessed 8th April 2019. 
91 See recitals 71 and 75 GDPR, see discussion in Ann Bevitt and Laura Dietschy, ‘Legislative Comment: GDPR 
series: the risks with data profiling’ (2016) 17(2) Privacy and Data Protection 7. 
92 Ann Bevitt and Laura Dietschy, ‘Legislative Comment: GDPR series: the risks with data profiling’ (2016) 17(2) 
Privacy and Data Protection 7. 
93Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Guide to the GDPR’, available at https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-
rights/rights-related-to-automated-decision-making-including-profiling/  
94 Defined in the regulation as: Art 4: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, 
in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online 
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity of that natural person;’ 
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sum, the GDPR leaves plenty of room for individuals to be harmed in a big data context which 
HMBs could help address. 
 
3. Financial Support Fund: Appeals Process 
Turning next to the practical operation of the financial support function, three main questions 
arise which will be addressed briefly here.  
 
i. Who could apply to the HMB for financial support and on what grounds?  
Given the focus on collective risk management/benefits, any natural person could apply for 
financial support if they could make a plausible case that they have experienced significant and 
undue harm by data use. An important feature of HMBs is that it would also be open to appeals 
from secondary data subjects - individuals whose own data has not been used, but who have 
been harmed by the use of other people’s data. Since there is no recognised relationship between 
the data controller and a secondary data subject under traditional legal approaches, it is 
questionable what duties the controller would have to such subjects within existing frameworks. 
However, third parties have been recognised as having rights in other contexts, such as within 
contract law,95 or insurance law.96 In the big data context, where ‘secondary harms’ will occur 
more frequently, effective protections are imperative in the recognition of individuals’ 
commitment to big data, and to ensure fairness given the power disparity between individuals 
and data controllers. The openness of HMBs to providing support to secondary data subjects is 
an expression of collective responsibility for harm resulting from any kind of data use. 
Importantly, as noted, the HMB would initially only allow claims from natural persons and not 
from corporate entities.  
 
                                                 
95 In the UK context, the relevant legislation is the: Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
96 In the UK context, the relevant legislation is the: Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010. 
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There would also be no time-limit on claims to the HMB. This is because general statutory 
limitation periods are designed for public policy reasons, namely: (1) it is unfair for companies 
or individuals to be challenged on basis of old allegations of wrongdoing  as evidence to prove 
or refute a civil action may become difficult to verify/obtain if a substantial period has elapsed 
between the alleged wrongdoing and time of the action being raised; (2) there should be a 
certain period of time after which a wrongdoer should not have the threat of legal action.97 
However, HMBs are designed on the basis of no-fault and as noted applicants apply for support 
from the HMB not the data controller, and the requirement is based on plausible connection to 
the data use in the HMB context which will be lower requirement to establish than the chain of 
legal causation required for traditional actions. Moreover, HMBs would be an instantiation of 
a collective commitment to support those who were harmed by (legal or illegal) data use and 
an acknowledgement that not all risks are foreseeable in the context of big data. In this spirit, 
depending on the severity of the harm and reasons for not taking a claim earlier, financial 
support could still be made at a time removed from the initial data uses. However, there would 
need to be a justifiable reason for the delay in making a claim to the HMB in cases where the 
harm was discovered long before the claim was applied for. 
 
ii.  How would a claim be made to the HMB, and how would payments (if any) be 
assessed?  
As briefly sketched above, a key feature of the HMB and its financial support mechanism is 
that it is simple to use and thus, bureaucracy would be kept as low as possible as a key objective. 
Therefore, a simple letter describing how a person has been harmed and how the person thinks 
this harm was caused (at least in part) by data collected or used by the data controller would be 
                                                 
97 The relevant legislation is Limitations Act 1980 (as amended) applicable in England and Wales which provides 
for a three-year limitation period for claims for compensation for personal injury. For claims in tort other than for 
personal injury the limitation period is generally 6 years from the date of the damage is sustained. 
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sufficient to be considered by the HMB. The HMB would then conduct an investigation into 
the matter. This could mirror the approach adopted by bodies such as the Motor Insurance 
Bureau (MIB) compensation system which offers financial support to individuals involved in a 
motor accident where the other party was uninsured, or where the other party is untraceable 
(e.g. if they left the scene of the accident) or for UK residents involved in accidents with foreign 
registered vehicles either in the UK or EU.98 Under the MIB scheme, claimants must submit a 
claim form99 including details of the incident where they are claiming injury/loss arose from, 
and supporting documents/details including: witness/police reports etc. Following receipt of the 
form the MIB then conducts an investigation which includes: “establishing the facts; 
confirming the identity of those involved; obtaining independent reports from motor engineers 
or witnesses; obtaining a police report; contacting other bodies such as the DVLA, your insurer 
or a foreign bureau.’100 Claims are dealt with within three months generally.   
 
Similarly, under the HMB, an individual would submit a claim form to the national HMB, 
providing a description of the harm suffered and circumstances of this, alongside supporting 
evidence including for instance, medical reports etc. depending on the harm allegedly suffered. 
The HMB would then consider such supporting evidence and could request independent 
assessments/opinions from data experts in deciding on the claim, and/or enter a dialogue with 
the applicant to obtain further evidence or information. A key difference between the MIB 
scheme and the process envisaged for HMB is that under the former, compensation is fault 
based - it is only paid where fault is established on part of driver that the claimant considers 
responsible and if the claimant is wholly/partly responsible compensation may be reduced or 
not paid.101 The HMB, in contrast, would work on a no-fault basis and financial support could 
                                                 
98 See https://www.mib.org.uk/making-a-claim/what-we-do/ It remains to be seen how Brexit and leaving the EU 
will impact upon this. 
99 https://www.mib.org.uk/media/418096/mib_claim_form_v0618_v2a.pdfaccessed  8th April 2019. 
100 https://www.mib.org.uk/media/216242/your-guide-to-making-an-mib-claim.pdf accessed 8th April 2019, 11. 
101 Ibid, 11. 
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be paid even if the data use was outside the scope of relevant laws, provided sufficient harm 
arising from data use could be demonstrated, and that it was plausible this resulted from the 
data use. 
 
If the HMB was satisfied that the harm suffered was significant, that it was undue, and that 
there was a plausible causation to data use, it could do any or all of the three following things: 
(a) acknowledge the harm and issue an apology to the applicant on behalf of the data 
controller(s); (b) feed information back to data controllers and policy makers, with the aim of 
improving procedures and rules to avoid such harm from occurring in the future; (c) make 
financial payments to support the harmed party under the financial support mechanism. 
 
iii. How would the decision-making process operate?  
HMBs would be governed by a steering committee independent from the data controllers that 
pay into the fund established by the HMB, which would develop a framework of criteria for 
decision-making by the HMB, in a transparent way and based on broad public participation. As 
noted above, HMBs would have appeals panels who hear and decide on appeals from residents 
of that country who complain of harm. Members of HMB appeals panels would include ‘lay’ 
members in their capacity as patients, etc., but also experts in data protection, marketing, 
security – depending on the size and remit of the HMB. Based on the decision-making 
framework, members of appeals panels would be free to consider any aspect that they deemed 
relevant provided the following conditions were met: (a) evidence of physical, psychological, 
financial, or reputational harm (b) a plausible case, on the balance of probabilities, would be 
made that the harm resulted, at least in part, from data collected or used by an organisation 
within the remit of the HMB. They would then decide what response would be adequate to the 
harm experienced by the appealing party, as noted above: an official acknowledgement of the 
harm with an explanation of what will be done to avoid that similar issues happening in the 
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future, and/or providing financial support. HMBs would need adequate financial resources to 
manage such a system and to ensure the independence of members to avoid issues of regulatory 
capture.  
 
C.  Evaluation and Feedback on Governance Systems 
As noted, alongside the financial support mechanism, HMBs would have an advisory role and 
would be required to produce an annual report providing an overview of the types and 
distribution of claims to the fund that it investigated and the outcomes of these. This should be 
used to feed into good practice recommendations on data-use as the HMB would be in an ideal 
position to assess how harms materialised in the previous year by having an overview of such 
challenges. In this role as a collector and analyst on the evidence on the frequency, nature, and 
severity of harms resulting from data use, HMBs could collaborate with DPAs – although also 
here, their role would go beyond the remit of the DPA which is limited to harms arising from 
unlawful data use. 
 
The feedback role of the HMB would form part of a process of reflexive governance.102 If, for 
instance, multiple claims were received in relation to a specific harm being caused by a data-
practice, this should highlight a pattern which would be identifiable by the HMB. The HMB 
could further investigate and highlight harm causing practices and could also seek to develop 
strategies of improvement and/or mitigation.  
 
The feedback role is an important reason for having HMBs at a national level, since this would 
allow patterns of use to be identified across the country which should lead to deeper insights 
than for instance if HMBs were to operate on a specific industry or organisational level. 
                                                 
102 Graeme Laurie, ‘Reflexive governance in biobanking: on the value of policy led approaches and the need to 
recognise the limits of law’ (2011) 130(3) Human Genetics 347-56. 
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Moreover, as harms are increasingly being triggered by issues that arise when datasets are 
shared across different areas and the combination of multiple data-sets, having such an 
overarching national body would allow a more coherent and comprehensive picture to be 
drawn. This should also help avoid the risk of some problems being missed, since a too narrow 
focus on a particular sector/industry might lead to ignoring the pervasive nature of the data use 
and harms triggered in the context of big data.  
 
In addition, having a national body would allow comparisons to be made in terms of the types 
of petitions which are refused by the HMB for support. If a pattern of refusals occurred in a 
particular context over time, it might require the HMB to reconsider how such petitions are 
being evaluated, or what should be fed back to corporate data users in such contexts to ensure 
that a gap between what individuals feel is acceptable and data uses occurring would be 
recognised. Where petitions were refused because harm was not plausibly connected to the data 
use, but a similar pattern was complained of by multiple petitioners, this could illustrate 
misplaced fears individuals might have about data use – which, if allowed to continue, could 
hamper beneficial progress of big data. If such patterns were detected by HMBs, they could be 
addressed by reassuring individual petitioners that harm was not plausibly connected with data 
use and also by further educational campaigns demonstrating how big data operates.  
 
Art 35 GDPR provides that for processing using new technologies likely to result in high risks 
to rights of natural persons, controllers are required to conduct assessments on the protection 
of personal data. 103  However, gaps will remain, given the difficulties in fore-sighting 
                                                 
103 See Information Commissioner’s Office guidance on Data Protection Assessments at https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-
governance/data-protection-impact-assessments/ ; Art 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact 
Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN WP 248 rev.01 as adopted by EDPB available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=611236  
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technologies and the challenge specific to big data. The feedback role intended by the HMB 
fills this gap and is intended to complement the forward-looking role of such impact 
assessments. This feedback role would also complement the role of Supervisory Authorities in 
each country under Art 57 GDPR. Such authorities are responsible for monitoring and enforcing 
the GDPR, and also “monitor relevant developments, insofar as they have an impact on the 
protection of personal data, in particular the development of information and communication 
technologies and commercial practices.”104 HMBs would complement this role, as while the 
Supervisory Authorities are likely to focus on issues arising due to failure to comply with the 
GDPR, HMBs look beyond this by considering harms arising regardless of the lawfulness of 
processing under the GDPR, and for all data uses not just uses of personal data. 
 
D. Operational Overview 
As noted, HMB could be established at the national level. A key feature is that they would be 
independent of the organisation, that is, the data controller, using the data and who review 
appeals from people who claim they have been harmed by data use.  HMBs would be funded 
by a set percentage of the budget of each research project or of the overall institutional budget 
(depending on the form of organisation in question) being set aside for this, initially set, e.g., at 
1%.  
 
We also recognise that part of the issue with the governance of big data is that the sharing and 
integration of datasets between institutions and organisations can give rise to harms that may 
occur from the combined use of datasets from different people across borders. In recognition 
of this, and of that fact that data given to one organisation (provided appropriate consent was 
given) can be used for other purposes which could create knock-on benefits in other contexts 
                                                 
104 Art. 57(1)(i) GDPR. 
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and jurisdictions, we suggest that if data users reside in several countries, the individual would 
apply to the one where she herself is a resident. 105  (While in this article we have used 
UK/European laws as an exemplar, we would hope that gradually other countries would adopt 
similar harm mitigation institutions and instruments.) 
 
We envisage that the operation of HMB would be an independent arm of, and overseen by, the 
Information Commissioner’s Office in the UK and equivalent bodies in other jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, there would be a national advisory committee/board dealing with HMBs which 
would have annual meetings and issue annual reports to the public. Representatives of data 
controllers would be invited to attend such meetings, and this would provide a forum for 
delegates to meet and exchange experiences or address common issues arising. Overtime, sub-
committees might also be established to provide a more specific forum tailored to particular 
industries, e.g. the health context. However, given that many harms are systemic, these 
committees would not replace the national meetings and instead would be designed more as 
awareness raising meetings translating the overarching issues into relevant contexts for each 
industry. The advisory board would receive annual reports from the HMB steering committee 
and appeals panels and use these to develop national standards/guidance documents. Over time, 
HMBs at a European or even international level could also be established, recognising that 
much research is not nation specific, and data flows across jurisdictions.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Novel practices of curating, storing, and using digital data require new ways of thinking about 
data governance. The individual focus in legal frameworks is no longer sufficient to capture the 
                                                 
105 This model rests on the assumption that on balance, the proportion of petitioners claiming harms for which 
financial support would be paid out corresponds with the proportion of funds coming into national HMFs via 
corporations residing in these countries (for example, Finnish users would experience harms from data use by a 
company residing in the USA). When this is not the case, an international mechanism to balance costs between 
countries would need to be implemented. Within Europe this could be addressed by EU law.  
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interests at stake or tackle the power asymmetries and inequities in costs and benefits of data 
use in the digital era. Moreover, key requirements of traditional legal remedies for corporate 
misuse of data – such as proving fault or causality – are no longer feasible in an era where data 
use is regularly not traceable. In addition, significant harms regularly occur from lawful data 
use.  In an effort to increase collective responsibility for harms that people experience from data 
use, whether lawful or not, we have sketched out the instruments of HMBs. We argue that 
HMBs provide a mechanism to address some of the power asymmetries that mark data use in 
the digital era. They provide support for individuals harmed by data-use/mis-use by offering 
mechanisms of financial support to individuals where no existing legal remedies are available. 
They also provide a mechanism for the reporting of data governance issues, thereby offering a 
reflexive governance tool which is vital for emerging areas of data governance and particularly 
for big data in the digital context given the pace at which this area is developing. We expect 
there to be aspects of HMBs that need further elaboration and refinement before these bodies 
can be considered for implementation. Towards this end, we hope this article will stimulate 
debate and inspire colleagues to help us improve and develop this idea further. 
